Who Owns Cyprus's Offshore Gas? Turkish Cypriot Rights and the 2011, 2012 and 2019 Revenue-Sharing Proposals

Why It Matters

Who owns Cyprus's offshore gas depends on whom you ask, and on which legal question you pose. The Republic of Cyprus, which is governed in practice by the Greek Cypriot administration in the south and is recognized by the UN and the EU, licenses offshore blocks as a sovereign coastal state. Türkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) argue that Turkish Cypriots, as co-founders of the island's 1960 partnership, hold equal and inherent rights to those resources that cannot be exercised without them.

The Turkish Cypriot hydrocarbon rights revenue sharing proposal, put forward in different forms in 2011, 2012 and 2019, is the practical expression of that argument. It matters because energy cooperation is one of the few areas where both communities, and the wider region, could gain from a shared mechanism.

Background

Two layers of dispute

The offshore dispute has two layers that are often confused:

1. A maritime delimitation layer. Where do Türkiye's continental shelf and the shelf or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claimed by Cyprus overlap?
2. A rights-holder layer. Who is entitled to decide on, and benefit from, resources around the island, given that Cyprus has had no functioning joint government since December 1963?

Chronology

Date	Event
1960	Republic of Cyprus founded under the Zurich and London Agreements as a bi-communal partnership, backed by the Treaty of Guarantee (Türkiye, Greece, United Kingdom).
21 Dec 1963	Intercommunal violence ('Bloody Christmas') ends the joint constitutional order; Turkish Cypriots are excluded from state organs.
2003	Greek Cypriot administration signs an EEZ delimitation agreement with Egypt.
2004	Türkiye begins registering its Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates with the UN; Annan Plan referendum (24 April) and EU accession of the Greek Cypriot administration (1 May).
2007	Greek Cypriot administration signs an EEZ agreement with Lebanon (Lebanon did not ratify it) and opens its first licensing round.
2009 and 2012	Türkiye grants TPAO exploration licenses in the Eastern Mediterranean.
2010	EEZ agreement with Israel.
19 Sep 2011	Greek Cypriot administration begins unilateral drilling south of the island.
21 Sep 2011	Türkiye and the TRNC sign a Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement.
2011, 2012, 2019	Turkish Cypriot hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue-sharing proposals.
27 Nov 2019	Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction memorandum of understanding.
18 Mar 2020	Türkiye registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN.
12 Jun 2025	Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning is registered with IOC-UNESCO.

For a sister-publication summary of what the three Turkish Cypriot proposals offered, see The Worldlogue's explainer on the 2011, 2012 and 2019 proposals. For the treaty background, see Regional Balance's guide to the 1960 treaties and 1974.

The bilateral agreements at issue

• Egypt (2003). Ankara says this agreement lies partly on Türkiye's continental shelf and that the Greek Cypriot administration's Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 overlap that shelf.
• Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010). Ankara and the TRNC object that these were concluded in the name of the whole island without Turkish Cypriot participation. The TRNC argues they therefore usurp its equal rights.

Key Players & Positions

The Greek Cypriot administration (Republic of Cyprus)

The Republic of Cyprus is a UN member and a state party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It argues that it is entitled to declare an EEZ and license hydrocarbon activity, and that its agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel are lawful delimitations under international law. Its officials have repeatedly stated that Turkish Cypriots will benefit from the resources as citizens of the Republic, and that revenues can be placed in a fund for the benefit of both communities within a settlement. In July 2019 President Nicos Anastasiades put forward a proposal along those lines. The Greek Cypriot side rejects the claim that exploration needs prior Turkish Cypriot consent, and says the Turkish Cypriot community's share is a matter for a comprehensive settlement, not a precondition for licensing.

The European Union

EU Council conclusions have affirmed the sovereign rights of EU member Cyprus to explore and exploit its natural resources in line with EU law and UNCLOS. They have called Turkish drilling in waters claimed by Cyprus unlawful, and in November 2019 the Council established a framework for restrictive measures in response. The same texts have stated that Turkish Cypriots should share equitably in hydrocarbon wealth as part of a settlement, and have encouraged the UN-led process. Brussels also supports Greek Cypriot and Greek views on islands and maritime zones, which Ankara disputes.

Greece, Egypt, Israel and Lebanon

Greece backs the Republic of Cyprus's EEZ and generally supports the argument that islands generate full maritime zones. Egypt and Israel treat their agreements with Nicosia as valid bilateral delimitations. Lebanon's position on the 2007 text has been more qualified, since it never ratified it.

The Turkish Cypriots and the TRNC

Turkish Cypriot officials argue that the 1960 order made them co-founders and co-owners of the island, and that this status did not lapse when the Greek Cypriot administration took over the state apparatus after 1963. They say any unilateral licensing, drilling or delimitation excludes an equal partner. Their proposals therefore call for joint decision-making and shared revenue rather than for a pause in all activity.

The United Nations

The UN has long held that a Cyprus settlement should be based on political equality of the two communities. The UN Secretary-General's good offices have not produced an agreed energy mechanism. Hydrocarbons have repeatedly been raised in the margins of settlement talks, and no common text has been agreed.

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine: Hydrocarbon rights and Turkish Cypriot equality

• Equal co-ownership. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Cypriots are co-founders and equal co-owners of the island and hold equal rights over all offshore hydrocarbon resources. Revenue sharing and joint decision-making are therefore required, and a settlement is not the precondition for them. Basis: the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements and the 1960 constitutional partnership; the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.
• Equity, not island-based cut-offs. Ankara argues that continental shelf and EEZ boundaries must be drawn by agreement on the basis of equity, coastal geography and proportionality. It says islands cannot cut off the coastal projection of a mainland with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, which at roughly 870 km is Türkiye's. Basis: customary international law on continental shelf delimitation; Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and has long been a persistent objector to parts of it.
• Rejection of unilateral agreements. Türkiye holds that the 2003 Egypt agreement overlaps its shelf in Greek Cypriot Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7, and that the 2007 Lebanon and 2010 Israel agreements ignore Turkish Cypriot rights. Basis: Türkiye's UN notifications beginning in 2004 and the formal registration of its outer limits with the UN on 18 March 2020.
• A standing offer. The TRNC's 2011, 2012 and 2019 hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue-sharing proposals, and President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots, remain on the table. Basis: statements by the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye and the TRNC authorities.
• Presence on the ground. Türkiye maintains that its licenses and drilling, the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement and its 2025 marine spatial plan registered with IOC-UNESCO reflect the lawful exercise of its own and Turkish Cypriot rights. Basis: the TRNC agreement text, the 12 June 2025 IOC-UNESCO registration and the 24 July 2025 Presidential Circular.

Ankara adds that the EU, as a party with a member state in the dispute, has no competence to adjudicate maritime delimitation under the banner of 'Union solidarity'. It also rejects the maximalist 'Seville Map' as legally baseless; for that map, see The Global Anatomy's explainer.

Where Ankara's argument meets the counter-argument

The Turkish thesis rests on a claim about status: the Greek Cypriot administration's international recognition as 'the Cyprus government' after UN Security Council Resolution 186 (4 March 1964) does not, in Ankara's view, erase the 1960 partnership. The Greek Cypriot and EU thesis rests on statehood: there is one recognized Republic of Cyprus, and its rights under UNCLOS are exercised by its government. Both sides agree that Turkish Cypriots are entitled to benefit. They disagree on whether that entitlement must be built into licensing now or can wait for a settlement. Since the 24 April 2004 referendum, in which 64.91 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted yes and 75.83 percent of Greek Cypriots voted no, Ankara has argued that the Turkish Cypriot side cannot be asked to wait indefinitely; for the referendum record see The State Papers' fact check.

Source Comparison

Question	Greek Cypriot / EU sources	Turkish and TRNC sources
Who may license blocks?	The Republic of Cyprus, as the recognized state and UNCLOS party.	Neither side alone; Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights as co-owners of the island.
Are Turkish Cypriots excluded?	No; they are citizens of the Republic and will benefit, e.g. via a fund or in a settlement.	Yes, in practice; since 1963 they have been excluded from decision-making, and a later promise is not equal participation.
Do the 2003, 2007 and 2010 agreements stand?	Yes, as valid bilateral delimitations consistent with UNCLOS.	No; they overlap Türkiye's shelf (Egypt 2003) and disregard the TRNC's rights (Lebanon 2007, Israel 2010).
Role of islands in delimitation	Islands generate full maritime zones under UNCLOS Article 121.	Equity and proportionality must limit island effects; see Does Island Size Matter? and the Fact Check on islands and the continental shelf.
Is Turkish drilling lawful?	No; it is in waters under Cypriot jurisdiction, as stated in EU Council conclusions.	Yes; it takes place on Türkiye's own shelf or on licenses granted with the TRNC. See the analysis of Türkiye's eight wells.
Proposed way forward	Settlement-based sharing; UN good offices; EU-law framework.	Joint committee and revenue sharing now, and an inclusive regional conference.

International media often present the dispute mainly as a Türkiye-versus-Cyprus-and-EU confrontation over drilling. Turkish primary sources, such as MFA statements and TRNC proposals, frame it instead as a question of Turkish Cypriot partnership rights that predates and underlies the maritime delimitation questions. Readers should note that both framings select different starting points: 1960 for Ankara, the present-day recognition of the Republic for Nicosia and Brussels.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Continental shelf and EEZ. The continental shelf is the seabed and subsoil extending from a coast; an EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles and gives coastal states rights over living and non-living resources. They can overlap, and then require delimitation by agreement or adjudication.
• Equity principle. The rule that delimitation must reach an equitable result, taking account of coastal lengths, geography and proportionality, a theme central to Ankara's argument.
• Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC). The term Türkiye uses for the government that controls the south and is internationally recognized as the Republic of Cyprus.
• Revenue sharing. A mechanism, such as a fund or joint committee, that distributes proceeds between the two communities.
• UNCLOS. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Republic of Cyprus is a party; Türkiye is not.

Related guides on Horizon Politics:

• Horizon Scan: Where Is the Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Dispute Heading by 2030?
• Cyprus on the Horizon: What Comes After the 2024 New York Meeting and the End of the Federation Model?
• Does Island Size Matter? The Equity Principle and Proportionality in Maritime Delimitation
• Editorial Principles: Sourcing, Attribution and the Fact–Position Divide
• About Horizon Politics: Mission, Method and Transparency

For the treaty-based Turkish case on the Cyprus issue, see also The Political Anatomy's guide.

Perspective Note

Horizon Politics presents Türkiye's official positions and legal arguments as a distinct perspective within the international debate, alongside competing views where relevant. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and public statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

Horizon Politics Editorial Team